ប្រវត្តិសាស្រ្តយោធា អ៊ុយក្រែន Ukraine Military History បានប្រមូលឯកសារនានា តាមបណ្តាញសង្គម ដើម្បី សិក្សា វិភាគ ប្រវត្តិសាស្រ្តយោធា អ៊ុយក្រែន ប្រយោជន៍សម្រាប់ វិទ្យាសាស្រ្តយោធាកម្ពុជា ដូចជា ទាក់ទង ប្រព័ន្ធ យុទ្ធវិធី ប្រព៍ន្ធអង្កេតការណ៍....ជាពិសេស បណ្តាញលេណដ្ឋានសង្រ្គាមកូរ៉េ ១៩៥៣
ប្រវត្តិសាស្រ្តយោធា--សង្រ្គាម រុស្សី អ៊ុយក្រែន 2022-2023
រុស្សី បានតម្លើងប្រព័ន្ធលេណដ្ឋានដ៍ធំបំផុតនៅ អឺរ៉ុប ចាប់តាំងពី សង្រ្គាមលោកលើកទី ២ គឺមានតែ ពេលនេះ ឆ្នាំ ២០២៣ ដែលរុស្សី តម្លើងប្រព័ន្ធលេណដ្ឋាន ប្រវែងប្រមាណ ១៥០០ គម ទទឹង ២០ គម ដែលមាន ច្រើនស្រទាប់ បង្ករជាឧបសគ្គ រារាំង ទាំង ថ្មើរជើង រថក្រោះ រថពាសដែល របស់ កងទ័ព ណាតូ អ៊ុយក្រែន អាមេរិក មិនអាច ឬ សឹងតែមិនអាច ឆ្លងកាត់បាន។ បើទោះជាឆ្លងកាត់ឧបសគ្គរួចតែវា បំផ្លាញ គ្រឿងចក្រ សម្ភារសឹក នឹងជីវិតកងទ័ព អ៊ុយក្រែន រាប់មឺន នាក់ ទំរាំ ឆ្លងឧបសគ្គ កំរាស់ ទទឹង ២០ គម សិន ទើបឈានដល់ ជំហាន ប្រឆាំងការវាយលុក Counter-Offensive ដែល ប្រជាជន កងទ័ពអ៊ុយក្រែន និង សម្ព័ន្ធមិត្តចង់បាន ។
ផែនទី ការឆ្លងកាត់ប្រព័ន្ធឧបសគ្គរបស់ កងទ័ពអ៊ុយក្រែន បាន ជោគជ័យ រំដោះមានភូមិ ១២ រយៈពេល ១ ខែ ធៀបជាមួយ រយៈពេល ១២ ខែ ដែលរុស្សី វាយគ្រប់គ្រងបាន គឺជាជ័យជំនៈធំធេងរបស់ ទ័ពអ៊ុយក្រែន នេះ ដោយសារ អ៊ុយក្រែន បំពាក់ បន្ថែម កងពលតូច រថក្រោះរថពាសដែក ១២ គងពល ខណៈដែល រុស្សី មិនអាច មានថវិការ រើសទ័ពថ្មី ដោយសារ សភារុស្សី ជំទាស់។ ដូច្នេះ ជ័យជំនៈអ៊ុយក្រែន គឺជា បេសកកម្មអត្តឃាដ ឈ្នះដោយ ព្រៃផ្សៃសម្លាប់ជីវិតកងទ័ព និង បំផ្លាញជំនួយយោធាអនេក របស់បណ្តាប្រទេស ផ្តល់ជំនួយ តែ ដូច ប្រធានាធិបតី អ៊ុយក្រែន បកស្រាយថា បើមិនប្រើវិធីនេះ គឺ គ្មានឪកាសជោគជ័យឡើយ !។
Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive is nervewreckingly slow and it’s freaking people out. Has something gone wrong or is this actually part of a larger more sophisticated plan? Let’s find out. A lot of folks out there feel like Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive should have gotten off the ground by now. With tens of billions of taxpayer dollars expended, a substantial inflow of material donations, and months of specialized Western training, there seems to be but little to show for it. Here’s the thing though: war unfolds at its own pace, and offensive operations are by far the most difficult to execute.
As one well-regarded op-ed writer recently put it, “Ukraine might not be winning this war yet, but Russia is losing–and its leaders and people know it.” Let’s dive into why this is true and take a closer look at how Ukraine’s counteroffensive could impact the type of operations Putin should expect in the future.
Let’s start with a quick flashback.
- Spring of 2023. The world watched in anticipation as Ukraine primed its forces for counteroffensive operations. By early June, the offensive had officially begun. As fighting concentrated in Ukraine’s southeastern regions, the first reports presented a grim picture as images were published of what appeared to be a Russian-blunted Ukrainian mechanized advance in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. It was the first recorded battlefield losses of Western- donated Bradley IFVs, MRAPs, and German-made Leopard main battle tanks–an outcome the Russian Ministry of Defense was all-too-giddy to confirm. But what contributed to these losses?
- After breaking through the first line of Russian defenses between Robotyne and Verbove, fifteen kilometers southeast of the important town of Orikhiv, the Ukrainian convoy in question met heavy resistance, hitting a minefield which caused on rushing Leopard 2A6 tanks and Bradley M2A2 IFVs to bunch up while an IMR-2 engineering vehicle was scrambled to clear the way ahead. ប្រព័ន្ធកំទេចចំការមីន និង ប្រព័ន្ធចំការមីន.
- While this was happening, the Russian army used a combination of KA-52 attack helicopters, drones, and well-placed artillery fire to destroy the grouped vehicles similar to the way we’ve seen Ukraine do time and time again since the start of the war. The Russians forced advancing Ukrainian forces into retreat after this preliminary strike by staging a counterattack with a second echelon of reinforcements. And with that, the engagement had ended. It was a tough look, if only because Ukraine set such a high standard during last autumn’s sweeping and unexpected counteroffensive. Images of the destruction quickly went viral–the episode shattering popular but misplaced myths touting the infallibility and superiority of Western-donated equipment that have circulated since the decision was finally adopted to give Ukraine western main battle tanks last year.
- Russian bots and bloggers alike were quick to lambast western faith in the Ukrainain’s native ability to seamlessly integrate so many new weapon systems in such a short time. But the truth is, we should not be surprised if we see plenty of similar videos in the months ahead.
5. The Ukrainians are in a dogfight for their survival. As General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently said, “This is going to be long. It’s going to be hard. It’s going to be bloody.” Western equipment can and will be destroyed–even in vast quantities–as the Ukrainains learn to deploy and utilize them efficiently at scale. And victory can only be earned in blood. Isolated snapshots of localized setbacks should never be confused as a reflection of the whole picture. The Ukrainians have proven they can learn, and will continue learning, from their failures.
6. The Russians–not so much. At least so far. We know Ukraine’s armed forces have formed twelve new brigades over the past few months, nine of them outfitted in modern western kit, three with older-issue equipment. The Ukrainian high command are in the process of leavening these newer forces with more experienced personnel who are extremely familiar with the exigencies of frontline service. Take note: Even at the time of writing in mid-July, still only a fraction of these units have been committed to battle.
7. Russian units manning many of the defenses these Ukrainians are trying to pierce have had months to prepare their positions and are considered more capable than the conscript forces thrown piecemeal into the theater after last-years’ operational setbacks. With all that said, the most important takeaway from any well-balanced analysis of Ukraine’s counteroffensive should be the truism that offensive military operations are almost always prohibitively costly. According to a report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia’s fortification network in Ukraine is the “most extensive defensive work in Europe since World War I.” ប្រព័ន្ធមហាកំពែងរុស្សី
8. There are interwoven and overlapping sections of trenches, earthen berms, dragon’s teeth, anti-vehicle minefields, razor wire, ditches, and artillery positions stretching thousands of kilometers from the Belarussian border to the Dnipro Delta. We’ll talk about why that matters in a little bit. But the innate difficulty in overcoming old-school defenses is part of the reason that despite Russia’s alleged military power, this conflict has already been ongoing now for almost a decade. That, too, is a fact we should not soon forget. Amid cautious warnings from Ukrainian leaders that the path ahead will require patience, the counteroffensive may not be proceeding at the pace we all expected.
9. But the barebones fact remains that Ukraine has already taken back over 100 square kilometers of territory in a single month–a feat that took Russia six months to a year to accomplish. That said, let’s take a closer look at some of the reasons why Ukraine is experiencing such profound difficulties.
10. The most successful offensives in history generally enjoy the same characteristics: They either enjoy the element of surprise, deploy an overwhelming amount of force or firepower, or, in the most optimal of cases, somehow manage to achieve both. Despite its access to the best Western military intelligence, its profoundly successful use of information warfare, and its integration of donated Western military equipment, Ukraine enjoys neither surprise nor material superiority. It has had to proceed fully conscious of the fact Russia has pre-deployed extensive fortifications, anticipated most, if not all possible axes of advance, and still, despite grievous losses, enjoys relative aerial, mechanized, and ground superiority–at least numerically. The front lines in Ukraine have remained mostly unchanged for months.
11. There hasn’t been much progress on either end, a striking situation if you consider the amount of effort Russia put into its successful but strategically bankrupt seizure of Bakhmut a few months ago. That offensive literally pushed the Russian war effort to its limit, straining relations between the Kremlin and the paramilitary group it had employed to do most of the dirty work in Bakhmut until Prigozhin got tired of the ineptitude and conniving of Putin’s defense chiefs and staged a mutinous and painfully public march on Moscow. It led to little, but it did reflect how interconnected a state’s political fortunes are with the outcomes of its military endeavors. Yes, there is a lot riding on the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Which is precisely why Ukraine is in no rush to bungle its opportunity to not only inflict long and lasting damage on its Russian enemy, but preserve the modernized army it has so painstakingly built up over the past year.
12. And so, it has done what all militaries do when they begin offensive operations. They probe for weak spots. Ukraine was already probing for weak spots when the Prigozhin near-mutiny went down, and it continues to do so. In a recent interview, retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Mark Kimmett observed that there have been three significant axes of attack thus far where Ukraine has attempted to find soft spots ripe for exploitation, primarily in the south and east. The first is in and around Bakhmut, where territory continues to flip back and forth between Ukrainian and Russian forces. Thus far, Ukraine has sought to occupy the high ground around the war-torn city in an attempt to establish fire control, clearer lines of observation, and better jump- off points for additional advances.
13. The result, according to General Oleksander Syrskyi, commander of Ukraine’s ground forces, is that “the enemy is caught in a trap.” Still, Ukraine’s gaze is fixed far beyond Bakhmut. If the opportunity presents itself along this axis of advance, Ukraine will try to blow its way southeast as far as the border, potentially severing Russia’s supply lines between its northeastern forces and those caught in its more exposed southern salient.
14. The second area is in and around Zaporizhzhya, the site of one of Ukraine’s most significant nuclear power plants. Similar to the Bakhmut, an advance in this region gives Ukrainian forces a clear shot to Berdyansk, where, if they can get to the coast, they can cut off the land bridge leading towards Donetsk.
15. The third and final area where Ukraine has been probing has been near Vuhledar, the site of intense fighting over the winter months. Here the same idea applies–cut through to coastal Mariupol, cut off Russia’s east-west supply line, and inflict chaos on the Russian troops caught in the southern pocket as they defend the road to Crimea. Kimmett went on to explain some of the reasons why Ukraine has struggled in its probing operations. Terrain has played a massive role. Barring offensive operations in urban settings, the terrain upon which Ukraine is operating is arguably a worst-case scenario. Ukraine’s eastern expanses, especially Zaporizhzhia, are predominantly agricultural–think patchwork fields radiating outward from smaller settlements and cities. It is flat–really flat. Open fields offer virtually no cover for advancing infantry, let alone mechanized vehicles. They are easily mined, but not easily de-mined. On their periphery, Russian forces occupy what few forests exist where they can easily focus machine guns, artillery, and air power on the exposed Ukrainian forces. So, the first challenge is the terrain.
16. How do you get the bulk of your forces safely across open fields? Well, as we’ve seen, very often you don’t. Technology and the nature of modern warfare itself plays a role here. Exacerbating the terrain conundrum, drones today rule the skies. Their omnipresence over Ukrainian and Russian
forces alike almost completely nullifies the possibility of achieving tactical surprise. Drones linger over the battlefield 24/7. In a recent visit by a reporter to a forward Ukrainian command post–basically an internet-equipped shipping container buried in a trench several hundred meters behind the frontlines in Donetsk–interviewed Ukrainian drone operators commented how “there are so many drones now that nothing goes unseen on both sides. Any movement, any attacks,” he said, “are going to be noticed and countered.” Yes, he qualified, “it's possible that we have the advantage in some areas, but it’s definitely wrong to underestimate your enemy.” Russians watch in real time just as the Ukrainians do as drone-targeted artillery fires register their strikes. They are becoming more and more accurate as a global suite of commercial drone options find their way onto the battlefield. During their interview, computer warnings gave indications that there was a Russian drone overhead. Most times, when drones are in the vicinity directing artillery or simply flying through, there is incredibly little warning. As we have seen with increasing and shocking digital fidelity, commercially adapted drones can drop grenades, take prisoners, kamikaze themselves onto an unsuspecting target, and coordinate combat arms in real-time so everyone knows what is going on.
17. Warfare is faster There’s less lag time. And that makes it far, far easier for Russia to respond to Ukraine’s persistent probing than ever before. It doesn’t help either that for all its myriad failures, Russian troops have in fact accrued valuable experience during their time in Ukraine. We may not like to acknowledge it, but Russian forces and their commanders are learning from their mistakes. While last year, as Russia rushed conscripts forward to cut its losses and prepare a hasty defense, Ukraine was able to liberate territory by overcoming these positions with surprise and astonishing rapidity, this year things are different. The lines are harder to move.
18. Trench warfare was the result of Russia’s realization it could not maintain momentum on the offensive. Breaking the maze of trenches as they are manned by more competent forces–is now just one of Ukraine’s biggest challenges. The broader issue is that Ukraine is not just dealing with trenches. ប្រព័ន្ធប្រឡាយជីក
19. Returning to the theme of fortifications prepared over a 600-mile front we mentioned earlier, the reality is that Ukraine’s elite have to grapple with up to “twenty-kilometers of hell” before their offensive can really take off. Once you get through the tank traps, there’s barbed wire, then there’s trenches, then there’s a minefield, then there’s dragon’s teeth, then there’s more barbed wire, trenches, and finally concrete bunkers. There’s no easy solutions, folks. Just ask General Kimmett, who spoke with decades of experience fighting in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq: “I can’t emphasize enough how difficult it is for a unit to get through this obstacle belt from hell. It’s among the toughest military operations that anybody can anticipate. Each defensive sector is unique. Each is designed to channel Ukrainian forces into clear killing zones and slow a Ukrainian offensive push in specific ways. “This is probably the toughest fighting outside the cities,” he added. In this defensive matrix, there is no such thing as an “insignificant barrier”; it is deliberate defense through and through. Like Hydra’s head, break one, and another immediately arises. Tank traps are simple but effective ways to inflict damage on Ukraine’s latest Western vehicles.
20. Big ditches inundated with water like moats are one option. Most, however, tend to be dirt revetments which force a vehicle up into the air as it goes over, exposing its most vulnerable soft spot–the lower guard on the underbelly. As the underbelly shows, even the strongest vehicles can be engaged and destroyed. Safely over the barrier, vehicles may think they are in the clear to begin offloading their infantry. But they immediately run into another centuries-old problem: Barbed-wire. While vehicles or dismounted infantry try to blow and cut their way through–and remember, these are just the advance elements whose job it is to clear a path broad enough for the bulk of Ukraine’s waiting forces–Russian forces manning interlocking and zig- zagging trenches begin opening fire. Russian machine gun fire rakes the fields before them. Soon, advancing Ukrainian soldiers are caught in the open as mortars and artillery, directed by lingering drones with pinpoint accuracy, begin cutting them to pieces. We’ve seen so many videos of small-unit trench engagements on the tactical level that it might be easy to forget just how traumatizing, sapping, and difficult it would be to clear even a single one. Is there ny wonder why the bloodletting continued on the Western Front for the better part of four years during World War I– and even then when the forces involved were sometimes firing four-times the the amount of daily artillery rounds than those expended by Russian or Ukrainian forces on their heaviest day?
21. Ukraine continues to lose many forces in close-range, almost hand-to-hand fighting over trench networks, and unless it can find a way to cut off these trenches from Russian lines, there is simply no other way through. This, in part, explains Ukraine’s recent attempts to source old-school cluster munitions from the West. Sometimes, to overcome an age-old defensive problem you need an age-old weapon–no matter how unethical it may seem– cluster bombs, after all, have been involved in the tragic devastation of many civilian communities–they nevertheless allow the destruction of a large fortified area. In the thinking of American and Ukrainian planners, if Russia has used them extensively in the war thus far, Ukraine should be able to use them as well to destroy Russian reserves and heavy artillery in the rear areas. This might give Ukraine the impetus it needs to punch through these defensive lines easier. Cluster munitions will not be the wonder weapon Ukraine needs to end the conflict as quickly as possible–there are no hard and fast solutions, remember? But until they can develop some semblance of a hard-hitting aerial presence over the battlefield, they might be part of broader program which enables them to advance even just a little bit easier. So, once over the tank traps, through the barbed wire, and the trenches, Ukraine is gucci, right? They’ve found the path ahead. Wrong, they’re still not even to the hard part. Those who manage to get through the first three obstacles now hit open minefields sewn with thousands of hidden explosives with terrible destructive power. Ukraine have already lost so much to these minefields they’ve had to rely almost entirely on dismounted engineer teams “crawling across minefields–sometimes literally on their stomachs–to detonate Russia’s defenses and clear a path for troops to advance.” There are antitank mines, anti personnel mines, and trip wires to grapple with, and these, more than anything, have stalled Ukraine’s offensive.
22. Just as cheap Ukrainian drones can destroy a million-dollar vehicle in a millisecond, cheap Russian–even Soviet mines–can maim the most capable soldier, destroy or disengage Ukraine’s precious Western vehicles, and stop a column cold. “You can no longer do anything with just a tank with some armor,” observed General Valery Zaluzhny in a recent interview. “The minefield is too deep, and sooner or later, it will stop and then it will be destroyed by concentrated fire.” Vehicles like the American Bradley infantry fighting vehicle and the German Leopard tank have been praised for their ability to withstand mine explosions and protect their occupants compared to older Ukrainian vehicles. But most times they are operating without air support or the level of remote mine-clearance equipment an advancing force would need to break Russia’s lines. One senior Ukrainian official said Ukraine has “received less than 15 percent of the quantity of demining equipment and engineering materiel…that it asked for from Western partners ahead of the counteroffensive. Some of that equipment arrived [in just the past few weeks].” When it does deploy mine-clearance systems in tandem with its Western vehicles, the Russians are deliberately targeting the special engineering equipment, “because without it,” one Ukrainian officer stated in true Gandalf spirit, “all the others will not pass.” While Ukraine tries to preserve the equipment they do have by having sapper teams of four painstakingly clear mines at night on all fours and without metal detectors because they are too visible, it is now asking for Bangalore torpedoes and other time-tested implements to assist them in this crucial mission–you know, a modern version of the same type of charges used by Allied soldiers to blow apart German defenses along Normandy’s coastline on D-Day in 1944.
23. ប្រព័ន្ធធ្មេញនាគ In another throwback to World War II, after the minefields there is another anti-vehicle precaution, the notorious “dragon’s teeth,” or closely aligned concrete triangles designed to stop vehicles or force them up into the air to get over–the same problem as earlier. If they do try to go over and through the dragon’s teeth, Ukrainian forces will then contend with casemated bunkers akin to those overlooking the beaches in Saving Private Ryan from which Russians can fire artillery, cluster munitions, and machine guns, or dispatch aircraft, helicopters, and drones. So yeah. Ukraine’s counteroffensive is going slowly. They’re contending with one of the most difficult problems in all of military history. And they, like Russia, are recognizing that defense is far easier, cheaper, and simpler. What can we expect moving forward? If Ukraine can create some sort of breakthrough, it will then try to exploit it with large formations of dozens of mutually supporting western tanks, mounted infantry, and artillery all concentrated and heading in a single direction. Most experts say this outcome, if it is to come, is still relatively far on the horizon.
24. Cluster bombs may be coming, but F-16s and other implements Ukraine says would be necessary to truly make the gains they desire are still similarly far off. Even when they come, they will not be enough to turn the tide. Time is what Ukraine ultimately needs to break down Russian positions. This is an attritional battle, after all. Yet Ukraine must strike a delicate balance; the more time elapses without tangible gains, the more Western and Ukrainian morale may flag. In the end, no matter how much it targets vulnerable logistics and command nodes, liberated territory and dead Russians are the only metrics which can deliver the morale boost necessary to secure victory–and until these mount in undeniable fashion, Ukraine will have a hard time staving off the type of disillusion and dismay that is already gaining traction in the West. Still, having summarized the problems they’re currently facing, our conclusion is far from grim.Quite the contrary: The fact Ukraine is on the offensive at all should speak volumes to everyone watching the conflict unfold. It is a testament to the reality that thus far, Ukraine has been doing what Russia has not–building its military into an apparatus capable of combined arms warfare. It still lacks many of the enabling systems it needs to excel in this, but as it learns from its failures, it will only grow stronger. But what do you think? Will Ukraine’s counteroffensive ultimately be successful? Let us know in the comments and don’t forget to subscribe for more military analysis from military experts.
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